Hoare's logic is an axiomatic system of proving programs correct, which has been extended to be a separation logic to reason about mutable heap structure. We develop the most fundamental logical structure of strongest postcondition of Hoare's logic in Peano's arithmetic P A. Let p ∈ L and S be any while-program. The arithmetical definability of N-computable function f N S leads to separate S from SP (p, S), which defines the strongest postcondition of p and S over N, achieving an equivalent but more meaningful form in P A. From the reduction of Hoare's logic to PA, together with well-defined underlying semantics, it follows that Hoare's logic is sound and complete relative to the theory of P A, which is different from the relative completeness in the sense of Cook. Finally, we discuss two ways to extend computability from the standard structure to nonstandard models of P A.
Introduction
Hoare's logic is a formal system for the derivation of statements about the partial correctness of programs [1] ; it was introduced by Hoare [2] and Email address: xuzw@ios.ac.cn (Zhaowei Xu) studied by Cook [3] , Lipton [4] , Wand [5] and Clarke [6] . Separation logic is a spatial logic for reasoning about mutable heap structure ( [7, 8, 9] ), which is an extension to Hoare's logic to describe the applications of programs on the heap structure and the reasoning about memory update. It would be interesting to reconsider Hoare's logic and the computability induced by the accessability relations on models of Hoare's logic, since Hoare's logic, taken as a modal logic [10] , defines its model M ′ on the assignments of the model M of the first-order languages based on which Hoare's logic is defined, which leads to the special form of the completeness theorem different from that of the first-order logic.
Hoare's logic for the set W P of all while-programs with first-order assertion language L and first-order specification T we denote HL(T ). The formulas in Hoare's system are triples of the form {p}S{q}, where p, q ∈ L and S ∈ W P . We also call the triple {p}S{q} a specified or asserted program. The specified program {p}S{q} is true in a first-order model M, denoted by M |= {p}S{q}, if and only if for any initial assignment of the program variables over M, if p holds and S is executed, then either S will fail to terminate or q will be satisfied by the final assignment defined by the program modality over M. Call the language L expressive relative to model M if for all p ∈ L and S ∈ W P there exists q ∈ L which defines the strongest postcondition of p and S relative to M. If L is expressive relative to M, then M |= {p}S{q} implies HL(T h(M)) ⊢ {p}S{q}, where p, q ∈ L, S ∈ W P and by T h(M) we mean the set of all true L-sentences in M. This is the so-called relative completeness(i.e. relative to some model) in the sense of Cook. In the following, let L be the language of arithmetic. Since L is expressive relative to the standard structure N, then any true specified program can be proved in HL(T h(N)). Bergstra and Tucker [11] studied verification on an entirely proof-theoretic basis, where the facts about arithmetic must be formally deduced from Peano's arithmetic P A or its refinement, and not popped from the oracle T h(N). The main theorem proved by them is listed as follows. Theorem 1.1 (Bergstra, et.al [1983] ). Given an assertion p ∈ L and program S ∈ W P one can effectively calculate an assertion SP (p, S) ∈ L such that (1) SP (p, S) defines the strongest postcondition of S relative to p on the set of states over N;
(2) HL(P A) ⊢ {p}S{SP (p, S)}. And, for any refinement T of Peano arithmetic, including PA itself, The requirement of expressiveness restricts the interpretation of P A to only the standard structure N up to isomorphism [4] . Therefore, relative to N, Bergstra and Tucker proved that HL(P A) can be reduced to P A, which is their original intent. Closer scrutiny of their argumentation reveals that Theorem 1.1 also holds relative to the theory of P A(i.e. relative to all models of P A) under the assumption that they generalized the classical coding function, which is used to code a finite sequence of natural numbers, to code an M-finite sequence of numbers for any model M of P A(i.e. generalized coding function), where by M-finite we mean the sequence has 'length' corresponding to elements in M. In the sequel, we develop our theoretical results relative to the theory of P A under this assumption.
The semantical definition of strongest postcondition is well formalized in Cook [3, p85] . Bergstra, et.al [11, p271] gives the formal definition of strongest postcondition of p ∈ L and S ∈ W P relative to N, i.e. SP (p, S) mentioned above, and proves some of its important properties as a theorem in P A. In this paper, we develop the most fundamental logical structure of strongest postcondition of Hoare's logic applied to arithmetic as it is defined by Peano's axioms, through which we can explain strongest postcondition more intuitively at the syntactic level. In principle, the N-computability induced by while-programs is equivalent to that of recursive functions, which are arithmetically definable [12, p199] , hence, we can arithmetically define N-computable function f N S induced by while-program S concretely. The arithmetical definability of f N S leads to separate S from SP (p, S), achieving an equivalent but more meaningful form in P A, which is illustrated as follows.
and n-place program S ∈ W P ,
. . , u n /x n ), stands for the result of substituting u i for each free occurrence of x i in p for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and α S (
The Separation Theorem captures the essence of the expressiveness condition. Replacing
(3) of Theorem 1.1, one can not just obtain a conceptual clarity, but also simplify the strongest postcondition calculus inside considerably. Then it follows the following corollary.
stands for the result of substituting y i for each free occurrence of x i in q for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The corollary reduces Hoare's logic grounded on the theory of P A to the first-order logic P A. If we can extend computability induced by S from the standard structure to nonstandard models of P A with the same
y ) in nonstandard model M of P A, then we can well define M |= {p}S{q} for any model M |= P A, which we denote by HL(P A) |= {p}S{q}. With the welldefined underlying semantics, it easily deduces that HL(P A) |= {p}S{q} iff P A |= p(
. From Gödel's Soundness and Completeness Theorem, together with Corollary 1.3, it follows that HL(P A) |= {p}S{q} iff HL(P A) ⊢ {p}S{q}. Consequently, Hoare's logic is sound and complete relative to the theory of P A, which is different from the relative completeness. More remarks about how to build the underlying semantics are left for the last section.
The paper is organized as follows: In Preliminaries, we give the formal description of Peano's arithmetic and coding functions. In section 3, we define Hoare's logic based on P A, its syntax and semantics. In section 4, we first give the definition of the N-computable function and argue its arithmetical definability; Then, we inductively construct SP (p, S) like that in [11, p273] ; Finally, with the generalized coding function, we prove the Separation Theorem. In the last section, we discuss the extended computability and our future work.
Preliminaries

Peano's arithmetic
By P A we denote the theory of Peano's arithmetic, which is the set of all sentences of the language of arithmetic that are provable from Peano's axioms. Also, in this paper, we treat P A as the logical system of Peano's arithmetic. The desired data type semantics is the standard model N. The domain of N is the set ω of natural numbers and its primitive operations are the addition x + y and multiplication x · y; < is the linear ordering relation on N; 0, 1 ∈ ω are two distinguished elements. We shall use these notations for the function symbols, relation symbol and constant symbols in L. Let L = {+, ·, <, 0, 1}. List the axioms of Peano's arithmetic as follows.
For simplicity, we abbreviate n 1 ′ s 1 + . . . + 1 as n. From the above Peano's axioms, we may observe that equations (S3)-(S6) alone define N under initial algebra semantics and so we may consider (S1) and (S2) as additions, making a first refinement of the standard algebraic specification for arithmetic, desired to rule out finite models. The theoretical objective of adding the induction axiom (S7) is self-evident: one wants to generate all assertions which make statements about N which can be based on its simple arithmetical operators and which can be proved by the principle of induction. For example, one can obtain facts about the ordering x < y of natural numbers by using the formula ∃z(
) be a countable model of Peano arithmetic, i.e. M |= ϕ for each axiom ϕ of P A, where M is the universe of M, and I is an interpretation such that
We call elements in N M standard, and nonstandard otherwise. There exists a nonstandard model of P A, which is a direct consequence of the compactness theorem(see the argument of Corollary 25.3 in [12, p306] ). For more information about nonstandard models, refer to Chapter 25 in [12] .
In this paper, we need to understand the order in nonstandard models of P A. Let K be the set consisting of all natural numbers together with all pairs (q, a) where q is a rational number and a an integer. Let < K be the order on K in which the natural numbers come first, in their usual order, and the pairs afterward, ordered as follows: (q, a) < K (r, b) if and only if q < r in the usual order on rational numbers, or q = r and a < b in the usual order on integers. Then, the argument of Theorem 25.1 in [12, p304] implies that Lemma 2.1.1. The order relation on any enumerable nonstandard model of P A is isomorphic to the ordering < K of K.
The semantics of the first-order logic has its standard definition in model theory and we assume to be understood. The validity of p ∈ L over model M we write M |= p. Let T be a theory of L. We write T |= p to mean that for every M |= T , M |= p. From Gödel's Soundness and Completeness Theorem, it deduces that T ⊢ p if and only if T |= p.
Coding functions
A function f : N n → N is arithmetically definable, or arithmetical for short, if and only if there is a formula F ( It is a well-known fact that there exist one-to-one correspondences between the set of natural numbers and the set of ordered pairs of natural numbers and, indeed, that such a correspondence can be set up in an effective manner [13, p43] .
For notational convenience, we denote (L(z), R(z)) byz. The pairing function can be extended to n-tuples by setting
To code a finite sequence (a 0 , . . . , a r ) of natural numbers, we can use two suitably chosen natural numbers s and t as codes, which is the following lemma [14, p177] .
Lemma 2.2.3 (β-Function Lemma).
There is a recursive function β : N 3 → N satisfying for every sequence (a 0 , . . . , a r ) over N there exist s, t ∈ N such that for all i ≤ r, β(s, t, i) = a i . Now, we define (x) i to be
Then, for any finite sequence (a 0 , . . . , a r ) of natural numbers, we can use one natural number c as the code such that (c) i = a i for each i ≤ r. Obviously, (x) i is a recursive function, which is arithmetical.
Hoare's logic based on P A
The logical language L ′ for Hoare's logic with respect to Peano's arithmetic consists of the language L of arithmetic, in which assertions describing a program's behavior are specified and the expressions forming the right-hand sides of assignment statements and quantifier-free boolean expressions of conditionals and iterative statements are specified, plus program constructs:
• constant symbols: 0, 1 ;
• function symbols: +, · ;
• binary predicate symbol: < ;
• variables for numbers:
• logical connectives and quantifiers: ¬, →, ∀ ;
• program constructs: :=, ;, if , then, else, f i, while, do, od.
An expression e is defined as follows:
and a boolean expression b is defined as follows:
A program S is defined as follows:
An assertion p is defined as follows:
Then, an asserted program ϕ is a Hoare's triple of the following form:
In the present context, we obviously prefer the more suggestive term specification to theory.
Hoare's logic with respect to the specification P A, has the following axioms and proof rules for manipulating asserted programs: Let S, S 0 , S 1 , S 2 ∈ W P ; p, q, p 1 , q 1 , r ∈ L; b ∈ L, a quantifier-free formula.
(1) Assignment axiom scheme: for e an expression and x a variable of L ′ , the asserted program {p(e/x)}x := e{p} is an axiom, where p(e/x) stands for the result of substituting e for free occurrences of x in p. 
And, in connection with (5), (6) Specification axiom: Each theorem of P A is an axiom. Note that the purpose of the specification is is to generate the assertions about the data types necessary to govern Consequence rule. The set of asserted programs derivable from these axioms by the proof rules we denote HL(P A) and we write HL(P A) ⊢ {p}S{q} in place of {p}S{q} ∈ HL(P A).
The semantics for Hoare's logic is a Kripke's possible world semantics, where the possible worlds are stores, and S are interpreted as modalities.
Let M = (M, I) be a model of P A and W the set of all the assignments(stores), functions from variables to M.
A model M ′ for Hoare's logic based on P A is the triple (W, {R S : S ∈ W P }, M) where R S is a binary relation on W such that for any w, w ′ ∈ W ,
• (w, w ′ ) ∈ R x:=e iff w ′ = w(e I,w /x), where e I,w is defined in the following;
• (w, w ′ ) ∈ R while b do S 0 od iff there exist natural number i and w 0 = w, w 1 , . . . , w i = w ′ such that for each 0 ≤ j < i, M, w j |= b, (w j , w j+1 ) ∈ R S 0 , and M, w ′ |= b.
Given a possible world w and an expression e, the interpretation e I,w of e in w is defined as follows:
if e = x e I,w 1 
where instead of using ⇒ as the logical implication in Hoare's logic, we use → 1 . Given a possible world w and an assertion p, we say that p is satisfied in w, denoted by M, w |= p, if
Given a possible world w, an asserted program {p}S{q} is satisfied at w, denoted by M, w |= {p}S{q}, if
Then, M |= {p}S{q} iff for any possible world w, M, w |= {p}S{q}. P A |= {p}S{q} iff for any model M of P A, M |= {p}S{q}. We also denote P A |= {p}S{q} by HL(P A) |= {p}S{q}.
Proof of the Separation Theorem
Arithmetical definability of N-computable functions
Let N ′ = (W, {R S : S ∈ W P }, N) be the model of Hoare's logic based on P A, where R S is the accessibility relation for S ∈ W P over the standard structure N, and ⇀ x the list of variables of length n occurring in while-program S in the following. R S induces a vectorial function f S : N n → N n such that for any
if and only if there exist w, w ′ ∈ W such that w(
of f S is a function from N n to N. We call the function f
S is N-computable.
Lemma 4.1.1. f S is well-defined. That is, for any w 1 , w
Proof. By induction on the structure of S.
Next, we study how to arithmetically define f S . Construct the formula α S inductively in L.
Iteration: S ≡ while b do S 0 od. First, define
and so define
Lemma 4.1.2. f S is arithmetically definable by α S .
Proof. It is equivalent to prove that for any
The argument is an induction on S for which the basis is the assignment statement.
Assignment:S ≡ x i := e. f S ( 
is correct ⇔ there exist natural numbers
i and w such that
Define α Then, we can easily achieve that f (i) S is arithmetically defined by α (i) S from the above lemma. Actually, these two definabilities are interconvertible.
The definition of SP (p, S)
Now, we define strongest postconditions. Given the model N ′ = (W, {R S : S ∈ W P }, N) of Hoare's logic based on P A, p ∈ L and S ∈ W P , then the strongest postcondition sp N (p, S) of p and S relative to N is the set of possible worlds:
From the definitions, it immediately follows that
Like the definition of SP (p, S) in [11, p271] , we can inductively define SP (p, S) over the structure of S as follows:
where INV (p, b, S 0 ) is the loop invariant formula(refer to Invariant Law in [11, p277] ) built up as follows. First, define
The definition of SP (p, S) in [11, p271] entails:
From the preceding two lemmas, it deduces that
Lemma 4.2.3 is a special case of statement (3) in Theorem 1.1, when restricting the model of P A to N.
Proof of the Separation Theorem:
The equivalent form of SP (p, S) in P A Until now, we have finished all the preparations for the Separation Theorem. Let's turn to the last part of the proof of the theorem. In the sequel, we argue that SP (p, S) has an equivalent form ∃
Proof. By Gödel's Soundness and Completeness Theorem,
Consequently, it suffices to prove for any M |= P A,
Fix M |= P A. The argument is by induction on the structure of S for which the basis is the assignment. Assignment:S ≡ x i := e. According to the definition, SP (p, S)(
by pure logic and the definition of α S (
Composition: S ≡ S 1 ; S 2 . The induction hypothesis applied to S 1 and S 2 yields
Consider this last formula through several transformations: replacing
With the substitution of
By pure logic, it is equivalent to
Thus, by the definition, SP (p, S)(
By the above argument, it is equivalent to
Conditional: S ≡ if b then S 1 else S 2 f i. By the induction hypothesis applied to S 1 , S 2 , it yields
According to the definition, SP (p, S)(
Consider this last formula through several transformations: by substitutions, it is equivalent in M to
.
So, we obtain
Iteration: S ≡ while b do S 0 od. Applying the induction hypothesis to
By the generalized coding function assumed by Bergstra, et.al [11] , the last formula in the above theorem is equivalent in M to
Substituting (w) j+1 for each free occurrence of ⇀ x in the above formula gives
From the definition, it follows directly that B(p, b, S 0 )(i, w,
By the above formula, it is equivalent to
According to the definition of
With the generalized coding function, it is equivalent in M to 
Thus,
M |= SP (p, S)(
And we are done.
Discussion and Future Work
The corollary 1.3 looks on α S as the logical characterization of whileprogram S in P A. In the sequel, we shall extend the computability induced by S from the standard structure to any nonstandard model of P A through α S . Lemma 4.1.2 presents that α S arithmetically defines f On the other hand, up to now, we have known that the number of iterative steps of a loop is defined in the standard part of M, as treated in this paper. In this semantics(type-2 semantics), the M-computable function induced by S on M is defined in N M , i.e. id To make the type-2 semantics defined logically, introduce a new predicate symbol to the language of arithmetic, which defines N M in M, and restrict its occurrences in formulas, say in a guarded fashion. The paper [15] is an attempt for the type-2 semantics.
